What is identity? Brubaker and Cooper provide a lengthy critique of the concept of identity and its use in scholarly discourse. Their main objection is that “identity” means too many things that often conflict: strong conceptions of identity are given at birth and static whereas weak conceptions of identity are so ever changing that they cannot be used to analyze anything. The authors then present several alternative terms that can be used in place of “identity.” For the purpose of political scientists, it seems that we need to adopt Tilly’s conception of identity wherein identity is fluid enough to be constructed by social events, but robust enough to actually categorize individuals empirically and for citizens to have some general sense of what these identity-based categories are.
This is one of my favorite journal articles because I feel like it does two things well. First, it juxtaposes common conceptions of identity with the definitional strength that we need in political science in order for identity to mean anything and to be measured. But second, it serves as a warning to political scientists that we must be careful when thinking about identity and the context in which we want to measure it. Because identity is flexible and can be constructed by individuals, we will do a poor job trying to guess the primary identity of any one person at any one point in time. But, governments and states want to activate identities and collective identification in people in order to develop political support. I came away from the reading feeling that the authors’ complex writing style conveyed the intricacies of measuring and thinking about identity.
I am torn in answering the reading question as to whether I should try to synthesize the points in the reading and advance a definition of identity or whether I should abandon the term like Brubaker and Cooper do and define something else. For political science, I think identity should be based on the concept of groups. Especially in this course, collective action is required to gain political representation or to make individuals’ voices heard. In this group conception, some identities are descent-based or are inherited characteristics from birth, while others are acquired and are molded through experiences in life. Identity is plural: I can be a member of multiple groups, and certain identities can be activated to become my primary identity at a given time. Whereas primary identities are very fluid, the basic identity categories to which I belong are varying degrees of sticky and are harder to change. Identities are both self-defined and are defined by others and imposed on people. These two forms of identity do not need to be the same.
These ideas about a definition of identity are probably just as murky as are many of the conceptions that Brubaker and Cooper put forward. However, I think that keeping the term identity is analytically useful because it is so common. Political science can clearly define what identity means in a given context and help to reveal that identity has many different flavors. For example, Brubaker and Cooper suggest calling self-identification and identification from others two different terms. Doing so would distance these concepts and suggest that the mechanism by which self-identification and other-identification work is different. I would argue that the underlying mechanism is the same, but the way that individuals perceive identity in themselves is not necessarily outwardly portrayed such that others can pick it up. This can help explain why co-ethnic citizens are particularly bad at guessing the self-identified ethnicity of someone.
To illustrate this last point, I thought of an experience I had a few months ago in Delhi where I was staying at several different Airbnbs. One of the Airbnb owners was really interested in where else I had stayed and in comparing their house to that of others. Once he learned of one of the places I stayed, he wanted to know the name of the host so that he could figure out their caste. I told him the name, but the name is relatively generic and does not signal caste. In this way, other-identification failed: the host was really annoyed and told me I must have gotten the name incorrect or else he would be able to figure out the other host’s caste.
I am torn in answering the reading question as to whether I should try to synthesize the points in the reading and advance a definition of identity or whether I should abandon the term like Brubaker and Cooper do and define something else. For political science, I think identity should be based on the concept of groups. Especially in this course, collective action is required to gain political representation or to make individuals’ voices heard. In this group conception, some identities are descent-based or are inherited characteristics from birth, while others are acquired and are molded through experiences in life. Identity is plural: I can be a member of multiple groups, and certain identities can be activated to become my primary identity at a given time. Whereas primary identities are very fluid, the basic identity categories to which I belong are varying degrees of sticky and are harder to change. Identities are both self-defined and are defined by others and imposed on people. These two forms of identity do not need to be the same.
These ideas about a definition of identity are probably just as murky as are many of the conceptions that Brubaker and Cooper put forward. However, I think that keeping the term identity is analytically useful because it is so common. Political science can clearly define what identity means in a given context and help to reveal that identity has many different flavors. For example, Brubaker and Cooper suggest calling self-identification and identification from others two different terms. Doing so would distance these concepts and suggest that the mechanism by which self-identification and other-identification work is different. I would argue that the underlying mechanism is the same, but the way that individuals perceive identity in themselves is not necessarily outwardly portrayed such that others can pick it up. This can help explain why co-ethnic citizens are particularly bad at guessing the self-identified ethnicity of someone.
To illustrate this last point, I thought of an experience I had a few months ago in Delhi where I was staying at several different Airbnbs. One of the Airbnb owners was really interested in where else I had stayed and in comparing their house to that of others. Once he learned of one of the places I stayed, he wanted to know the name of the host so that he could figure out their caste. I told him the name, but the name is relatively generic and does not signal caste. In this way, other-identification failed: the host was really annoyed and told me I must have gotten the name incorrect or else he would be able to figure out the other host’s caste.
| A Room in Delhi |
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